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The Flesh, which is not One:  
Meditations on Multiplicity and its Populist Arrest 
 




By tracing the political resonances of the concept of the ‘real’ in its 
different theorizations -particularly in relation to singularity and border, and its 
opposite, multiplicity and entanglement-  in this  paper we highlight the existing 
relation between epistemological frameworks and political imaginaries or 
regimes/horizons. In order to do undertake this task,  we offer a critical 
conceptual triangulation between Chantal Mouffe’s account of the current 
‘populist moment’, and the theorization of the real in the work of Jacques Lacan 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. By mobilizing a dialogue between psychoanalysis 
and (post)phenomenological thinking, we suggest that if the real is not 
conceptualized as an ontological negativity that the empty signifier needs to 
tame, but as an aesthetic, embedded and embodied experience of multiplicity, we 
can think beyond the logics of antagonistic antagonism and instead embrace the 




In For a Left Populism (2018) Chantal Mouffe rightly claims that we live a 
“populist moment”. In her view, this moment is characterized by “the emergence 
of manifold resistances against a politico-economic system that is increasingly 
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perceived as being controlled by privileged elites who are deaf to the demands of 
other groups in society” (Mouffe, 2018, p. 18). Her program is to capture this 
unrest and re-articulate the emergence of ‘the people’ from within a leftist 
imaginary. Distancing ourselves from those institutional analyses that focus on 
the supposed ‘failure’ of political institutions to absorb unfulfilled demands 
(Muller, 2017; Mudder & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; 2017), in what follows we 
would like to pursue a different line of argument. Our claim is that rather than 
showing a failure, populism shows the ‘success’ of a particular type of 
epistemology. As we know, the Brexit vote aimed primarily to eliminate free 
movement from Europe to the UK. In the same way, Trump promised and 
delivered open repression of migrants arriving to the USA/Mexico border.  
Austria’s plans to ‘clamp down’ on refugees and the refusal of Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland to set refugee quotas, are also examples of a staging of a 
populist, antagonistic logic. Indeed it is fair to say that we today live ‘inside’ a 
grammar where material and symbolic borders, and the exclusion they secure, 
are seen as preconditions for the formation of collective meanings, 
national/ethnic identity formation, and guaranteeing social order. We will call 
this grammar the epistemology of the ‘One’, whose roots are embedded in 
Kantian-Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
Contemporary social and political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe have mobilized these populist premises while deploying Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to understand the inescapable nature of social antagonism and 
the relation between social order and enjoyment (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 
Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2018).  Throughout their work, they argue against notions 
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of ‘the common’ or ‘multiplicity’, asserting the need to acknowledge negativity 
and social antagonism, as they exist “in the hegemonic nature of the social order” 
(Mouffe, 2018, p. 55).  By doing so, and by embracing a version of the real as 
dichotomist negativity, we would like to argue, they have reduced the space of 
multiplicity and indeterminacy to a dichotomy of Schmittean friend/enemy 
antagonism (Arato, 2013).   
Our critique of this epistemology of the ‘One’ and its populist arrest will 
be guided by a close look at Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theorizing of the ‘flesh’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964a; 1964b; 1968).  As we will see in what follows, in his 
account, the ‘real’ of intersubjectivity is defined as a plural intercorporeal field of 
intertwined ‘visible-seers’ that are of the world as much as in the world, and that 
are of the same ‘element’—flesh—of the other visible-seers that populate it; 
visible-seers that are open to the others, to the world, and to the visible and the 
invisible as well as to the others that see and perceive as much as they do. We 
claim that this portrait of an intercorporeal and open multiplicity could inspire 
the rethinking of social and psychoanalytic concepts that, in their conventional 
understanding, tend to affirm singularity and repression. This irreducibly plural 
and intercorporeal relationality (Butler, 2015) of the social world does not 
match well with the simplified—i.e. dichotomized—view of the relational field of 
political identities that Laclau and Mouffe offer. Without wanting to reduce 
complex and diverse political scenarios to single conceptual categories, our aim 
in this paper is to highlight the existing relation between epistemological 
frameworks and political imaginaries or regimes/horizons. More specifically, we 
would like to trace the political resonances of the concept of the ‘real’ in its 
different theorizations, particularly in relation to singularity and border or 
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frontier (as central in contemporary populists discourses), and its opposite, 
multiplicity and entanglement, that see populism or any nominalist project that 
aims at ‘conceptual singularity’, as the cancellation of heterogeneity (Palacios, 
2019). In our view, both, key sociological  and    psychoanalytic concepts have 
been complicit in the theorizing of alterity and multiplicity as threatening: 
Durkheim’s inaugural lectures on the sacred and the profane and the need to 
evacuate anomie from social life and Freud’s theorizing of narcissism and the 
splitting of the Ego are good examples of how these disciplines have contributed 
to the strengthening of an ontology that erects a barrier between the self and the 
other, while simultaneously fostering an epistemology based on subject/object 
dualisms (Palacios, 2004; Palacios, 2019; Chritchley 1998; Butler, 2006. 
In order to do undertake this task,  we will attempt a critical conceptual 
triangulation between the way in which the current ‘populist moment’ is 
accounted  for by Mouffe, and the theorization of the real in the work of Jacques 
Lacan and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Our aim is to scrutinize the theoretical and 
political implications of an understanding of the relational dimension of 
subjectivities, taking into account the differences introduced by assuming the 
social to be ‘One’ or to be irreducibly multiple, even irreducible to the antagonist 
relation—or agonist, in its more recent formulation in Mouffe’s work. By 
mobilizing a dialogue between psychoanalysis and (post)phenomenological 
thinking, we would like to suggest that if the real is conceptualized not as an 
ontological negativity that the empty signifier needs to tame, but as an aesthetic, 
embedded and embodied experience of multiplicity, then we can move on to 




1. Mouffe and the ‘Populist  Frontier’ 
In what aspires to be a political intervention, Mouffe’s recent For a Left 
Populism, invites us to “seize this opportunity” offered by what she calls the 
“populist moment” (Mouffe, 2018, p. 1). She insists that the contemporary 
political scenario reminds her of what motivated her and Laclau to write 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy in 1985. Back then, she states, the left—still 
caught in class essentialisms—was not able to be receptive to the demands of 
second wave feminists and anti-racist struggles, among others. Through a 
Gramscian-inspired reading of post-structuralism, Laclau and Mouffe sought to 
rethink the socialist project in terms of the “radicalization of democracy.” 
(Mouffe, 2018, p.  2). This project, “consisted in the establishment of a ‘chain of 
equivalencies’ articulating the demands of the working class with those of the 
new movements in order to construct a ‘common will’ aiming at the creation of 
what Gramsci called an ‘expansive hegemony’” (p. 2). This expansive hegemony, 
Mouffe warns us, would never achieve a “fully liberated society” (p. 3) insofar as 
there would always be antagonisms, struggles and a partial opaqueness to the 
social. Without going into details here, let us remember that the theory of 
hegemony and antagonism introduced by Laclau and Mouffe in the mid-eighties 
followed a strict Lacanian logic. As Zizek commented: “In short, Laclau and 
Mouffe have, so to speak, reinvented the Lacanian notion of the Real as 
impossible; they have made it useful as a tool for social and ideological analysis” 
(Žižek, 1990, p.  249). Indeed, in his On Populist Reason, Laclau claims: “The logic 
of the object petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar: they are 
identical” (Laclau, 2005, p. 116). And he continues: “In political terms, that is 
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exactly what I have called a hegemonic relation: a certain particularity which 
assumes the role of an impossible universality” (Ibid, p. 115). Furthermore, 
Laclau claims that Lacan’s object-a is a key element in a social ontology as the 
whole is always going to be embodied by the part.  This is the role of ‘the people’: 
to become the absent fullness of society. What this means is that according to 
Laclau and Mouffe society (as well as meaning, subjectivity and order) can only 
exist within a (constructed) totality with clear borders. Or to put it differently, 
their work confronts us with an ‘ontological’ dimension of the social 
characterized by an intrinsic and unavoidable lack and an ‘ontic’ expression of 
this ontology. Whereas the first refers to the realm of the political (or  
ontological) the second addresses the realm of politics (the contingent or ontic) 
that consists in the permanent creation of provisional hegemonic closures that 
cover (discursively and affectively) this antagonistic gap.  
 
Following closely Laclau’s definition of populism Mouffe affirms that society is 
always divided and discursively constructed through hegemonic practices,  (Ibid, 
p. 10), and that in order to “seize this opportunity it is vital to acknowledge that 
politics is by nature partisan and that it requires the construction of a frontier 
between ‘we’ and ‘they’” (Mouffe, 2018, p. 85). Aligning herself with Schmitt, 
Mouffe acknowledges the tension between a liberal grammar in its reference to 
universality, and the grammar of equality, which requires the construction of the 
people and the tracing of a frontier between a “we” and a “they” (Ibid, p. 15). In 
the current context, Mouffe  argues that in order to deepen democracy “it is 
necessary to establish a left populist political frontier” (Ibid, p. 5) between ‘the 
people’ and ‘the oligarchy’. She continues “in recreating political frontiers, the 
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‘populist movement’ points to a ‘return of the political’ after years of post-
politics” (Ibid, p. 6). Mouffe argues for the need to provide a different vocabulary 
where popular demands can be articulated from an egalitarian perspective, and 
by doing so, create a different political frontier: “in a different vocabulary and 
directed towards another adversary” (Ibid, p.23).  
Going back to Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Mouffe explains that for 
relations of subordination to be transformed into sites of antagonism “one needs 
the presence of a discursive exterior” (i.e. the ‘real’) from which the discourse of 
subordination can be interrupted (Ibid, p. 44). Furthermore, according to her, 
the new hegemonic articulation must be secured around key symbolic signifiers 
(or nodal points) that will secure a common sense and provide a normative 
framework to the given society. A left populist hegemony would thus consist of 
the creation of a “new historical bloc based on a different articulation between 
the constitutive political principles of the liberal-democratic regime and the 
socioeconomic practices in which they are institutionalized. (…) its objective is 
the construction of a collective will, a ‘people’ apt to bring about a new 
hegemonic formation” (Ibid, p. 45). This populist hegemony – or a populist chain 
of equivalencies –  means that each particular demand is split: “on the one hand 
it is its own particularized self; on the other it points, through equivalential links, 
to the totality of the other’s demands” (Ibid, p. 63).  The necessity of the drawing 
of the political frontier becomes clear: the ‘we’ and the ‘they’ is decisive for the 
construction of a ‘people’. 
 In clarifying the implications of her position, Mouffe states that “Laclau 
defines populism as a discursive strategy of constructing a political frontier 
dividing society into two camps and calling for the mobilization of the ‘underdog’ 
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against ‘those in power.’ It is not an ideology and cannot be attributed a specific 
programmatic content. Nor is it a political regime. It is a way of doing politics 
that can take various ideological forms according to both time and place, and is 
compatible with a variety of institutional frameworks” (Mouffe, p. 10-11, 2018). 
Populism is not a political regime, Mouffe says. As we have argued elsewhere, 
however, a political regime, or a regime of politics, could be understood as a 
structuring horizon or imaginary rather than as a self-contained political system 
or social formation (Plot, 2014: pp. 1-19; Plot, 2018.) Political regimes coexist 
and are in permanent conflict with each other. They sometimes hegemonize, 
sometimes see themselves subordinated to the dominant presence of alternative 
regimes. They are indeed ways ‘of doing politics’ and ‘cannot be attributed a 
specific programmatic content,’ as Mouffe puts it. So our point is that populism 
should indeed be understood as a regime in this sense, as a way of doing politics, 
and this is in partial agreement with Laclau and Mouffe. However, and this is 
what we ask, what kind of way is this way of doing politics? What are its 
implications? If populism is a way of doing politics, does it mean that there are 
alternative ways as well or is it the only way of doing politics? If there are other 
ways, what is it that makes them differ from each other? More importantly for 
this article, what is the epistemology upon which the notion of the antagonistic 
‘political’ is based on? 
 
2. The Epistemology of the ‘One’: Lacan against the phenomenologists 
 
As we will see in the following two sections, the real, or what seems to escape 
symbolic determination, can be thought of in various ways. In our paper, and 
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given our interest in studying the epistemology of populism, we are focusing 
particularly on a debate between Lacan and Merleau Ponty. Interestingly, for 
Lacan the real is that which by ‘not being  there’ allows for phenomenological 
experience to take place.  For Merleau Ponty, on the other hand, the real is 
thought of as a ‘fleshy being-with’.  While the first definition stresses exclusion, 
interruption and void, the second establishes an infinite web of mutual belonging 
and dependency.  If the first has inspired the thinking of political antagonism and 
fantasy, the latter rather forces us to think of assemblages and irreducible 
multiplicities. 
While it is not the intention of this section of the paper to give a 
comprehensive account of the relation between Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
phenomenology, a quick look at the reversal of the phenomenological experience 
as formulated by Lacan in opposition to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty will be 
helpful to the development of our argument. 
Although phenomenologists in the twentieth century were seeking to 
supersede Husserlian metaphysics by grounding notions such as dasein and the 
flesh of the social and move away from any form of subjective transcendentalism, 
Lacan, while getting inspiration from these ideas (Lacan, 1998,) was also quick to 
critique them from a Kantian/Freudian perspective.  By doing this, he re-inserted 
a type of transcendentalism—that was already on its way out in the late 
Merleau-Ponty—back into the phenomenological picture. Indeed Lacan states 
that he will put phenomenology upside-down, as the object, for him, is neither 
the empirical object that we experienced through our senses (i.e., the object of 
desire), nor the Husserlian transcendental noema. Instead, Lacan affirms, object 
a is that which by ‘not being there’ allows the phenomenological experience to 
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take place: desire and knowledge are possible only because of the exclusion of 
the ‘real’. The work of Lacan that has inspired and enraged feminists (Mitchell 
and Rose, 1982; Grosz 1990; Kristeva, 1980; Copjec, 1994, 2004; Irigaray, 1993; 
Ettinger, 2006) has also been read from continental philosophy quarters. In this 
context, his work has been considered to follow a Hegelian phenomenological 
path, while largely focusing on the struggle for recognition as presented in  the 
master/slave dialectic. Authors such as Peter Dewis and Malcom Bowie, 
according to Eyers (2012), helped to create a scholarly climate for Lacan’s 
reception that “foregrounded the influence of post-Kantian European philosophy 
at least on a par [?] with that of Freud” (Eyers, 2012, p. 6). 
The reinsertion of Kantian language in Lacan’s theorizing (and in Mouffe 
and Laclau) is not only relevant from the perspective of the history of ideas. 
Indeed, it is our contention that various epistemologies of the real are directly 
related to critical approaches to the social and associated to various political 
projects. This is a conceptual crossroads where phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis face each other and the character of that encounter can open or 
close radically alternative political horizons. Although feminists were quick to 
react against Freud’s and Lacan’s theoriziation of the signifier of the phallus as 
granting meaning to the otherwise undifferentiated mother-child relation, post 
colonial and race theorists have made a stronger argument by showing the 
relation between the Kantian definition of negativity (threat) and the very basis 
for the foundation of modernity. For example, in his last book Stolen Life (2018), 
Moten claims that it is precisely ‘blackness’ that stands as the outer marker of 
humanity and that race becomes the ground upon which critical philosophy is 
built. That is, the thinking of negativity—the thingliness, the non-human, the 
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non- meaningful, the non-purposeful and without desire for freedom—was 
established in the philosophy of the enlightenment (and later Freud’s writing) as 
the “generative flesh” (Moten, 2018) against which white “coherence” 
(masculinity) could become into existence.  
As it is well documented (Smith and Woodruff Smith 2006; Rockmore 
2011), Husserl had taken the Kantian idiom of transcendental idealism as a way 
to give account for the conditions of knowledge formation and consciousness. At 
the same time, he suggested that only by bracketing the world around us 
(epoché) and turning our attention to the very structure of the 
phenomenological experience, was it possible to discern how consciousness was 
always about something—i.e. that consciousness had intentionality. Heidegger 
disagreed with this transcendentalism and Husserl’s method of bracketing. 
Instead, in his Being and Time (1927), and through the study of a particular 
‘being’, he explored the meaning of Being the human subject (Da-sein). By 
scrutinizing the features of Dasein and particularly its temporality, Heidegger 
expected to know the meaning of Being as such. As an historical entity, 
Heidegger argued, Dasein is immersed in the world and is itself part of the world 
and, as such, has a beginning and an end. This historicity, according to Heidegger, 
was accompanied with an experience of ‘throwness’ that refers to the projection 
of Dasein: Sheehan (1999) explains that Dasein (being-there) is ‘always already 
“standing out beyond” immediate contact with entities in such a way as to 
disclose the being/significance of those entities (…) As transcendence, human 
being is a “thrown projection”: thrust into responsibility for its own existence as 
a field of possibilities (thrownness) and thereby able to disclose and understand 
entities in terms of those same possibilities (projection).  
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In his late writings, Heidegger introduced the notion of ereignis, 
translated first as ‘enowning’ and afterwards as the ‘event of appropriation’. This 
is central for our argument, as Lacan and Merleau Ponty will also define a space 
of concealment (invisibility in Merleau Ponty; lack in Lacan) as allowing for the 
moment of appearance. Ereignis, in Heidegger’s philosophy refers to the tertium 
quid which allows Being and Logos to meet in the ‘clearing’ of aletheia (truth). 
This tertium quid in its essence remains concealed for things to be set forth into 
presence, and it refers not to a particular historical event but to the 
presupposition of all human events1. 
In Lacan’s ‘object a’ it is possible to clearly see this argumentative 
homology: “The object a is precisely that part of the loss that one cannot see in 
the mirror, the part of the subject that has no mirror reflection, the non-specular. 
The mirror in the most elementary way already implies the split between the 
imaginary and the real: one can only have access to imaginary reality, to the 
world one can recognize oneself in and familiarize oneself with, on the condition 
of the loss, the ‘falling out’ of the object a. It is this loss of the object a that opens 
‘objective’ reality, the possibility of the subject-object relations, but since its loss 
is the condition of any knowledge of ‘objective’ reality, it cannot become itself an 
object of knowledge” (Dolar, 1991, p. 13). But if for Heidegger that space of not-
being opens the possibility of authenticity, in the case of Lacan this space 
confronts us instead with the real of the death drive and jouissance. In Lacan’s 
words: “I challenge whichever philosopher to account now for the relation that is 
between the emergence of the signifier and the way jouissance relates to being. 
                                                        
1 For a more detailed reading of the relation between Heidegger and Lacan see 
M. Palacios’s (2013) chapter on “Death, Anxiety and the Vicissitudes of Action”, 
in her Radical Sociality. On Disobedience, Violence and Belonging.  
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[…] No philosophy, I say, meets us here today. The wretched aborted freaks of 
philosophy which we drag behind us from the beginning of the last [19th] century 
as the habits that are falling apart, are nothing but a way to frisk rather than to 
confront this question which is the only question about truth and which is called, 
and named by Freud, the death drive, the primordial masochism of jouissance. 
[...] All philosophical speech escapes and withdraws here” (Lacan quoted by 
Žižek, 2008, p. 7). 
It is crucial to remember that according to Lacan’s theory of subject 
formation, the subject emerges in the field of the Other under the signifying 
operation of the signifier of the ‘One’: ‘[T]here is no conceivable appearance of a 
subject as such except from the primary introduction of a signifier, and from the 
simplest signifier which is called the unary trait’ (Lacan, 1962-63, p. 22). As the 
signifier that represents the subject is in the field of the Other, Lacan talks about 
a primal alienation—or lack—as constitutive of subjectivity. This lack, as Lacan 
explains, is experienced as desire and framed by fantasy. ‘It is even qua thus 
marked by finiteness that for us, as subjects of the unconscious, our lack can be 
desire, finite desire, indefinite in appearance, since the lack, always involving 
some void, can be filled in several ways’ (Ibid, p. 26). Lacan is clear in affirming 
that the only truth (a truth that cannot appear phenomenologically as it’s 
repression is the very condition for the possibility of the phenomenological 
experience) is that of the death drive. From that very same perspective, he reads 
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of perception, and most poignantly, while 
critiquing his theorization of the gaze, Lacan also insinuates that Merleau-Ponty 
was onto something else when thinking of invisibility. 
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Lacan indeed occupied himself with Merlau Ponty at length in his Seminar 
XI (1998) where he claims that the gaze is neither imaginary nor symbolic but 
actually closer to the real as an object of the scopic drive. As Shepherdson (1997) 
writes, “In short, in the experience of the gaze, it is the subject who identifies 
with the object that would make the Other complete, fading or vanishing in a 
sacrificial movement of identification” (p. 84). 
 
3. The Flesh and its Multiplicity 
This simplified relationality in which the same and the other are seen as 
mutually exclusive and as resulting from a process of nominalization of 
multiplicity  is neither the only way of understanding the real nor the only way of 
accounting for intersubjective relations.  As we suggested at the beginning of the 
article, in political theorizations of this antagonistic logic (such as in Schmitt, and 
Laclau and Mouffe, for example), the precondition for the unity of a political 
entity involves the identification of a constitutive exterior.  The political might 
indeed imply negativity—i.e. have a diacritical logic—but this negativity would 
be viewed very differently if instead of conceiving it as binary, confrontational 
and mutually exclusive,  we were to understand it as plural, dis-centering and 
intertwined. The latter was precisely the form of relationality, and even way of 
doing politics, put forward by Merleau-Ponty’s (1973) theorization of flesh.  
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “flesh” belongs to his late work and is at the 
center of three emblematic texts of the period, two of them published by him 
while still alive and the third one published posthumously, edited and 
supervised by Claude Lefort. The texts published in his lifetime in which the 
notion of flesh plays a central role are the Preface to Signs (1964a), originally 
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released in French in 1960, and Eye and Mind (1964b). Finally, the most 
important elaboration of the notion of flesh appears in an unfinished manuscript, 
the one on which Merleau-Ponty was working at the time of his premature death 
in 1961. The title finally given to the unfinished text—The Visible and the 
Invisible (1968)—was chosen by Lefort from a few other possible options. 
“Introduction to the Visible and the Invisible” was to be the introductory chapter 
of a much larger project, which at the time of Merleau-Ponty’s death was  titled 
“The Origin of Truth.”  
As we have already suggested, Merleau-Ponty’s death was sudden and 
unexpected. In Merleau-Ponty Vivant, a long essay written right after Merleau-
Ponty died, and subtitled “History of a friendship”, Jean-Paul Sartre, says: “There 
is no doubt about it. His readers may know him. He ‘met them in his works.’ Each 
time I become his reader, I shall get to know him—and myself—better. One 
hundred fifty pages of his future book are saved from oblivion, and then there is 
also ‘Eye and Mind,’ which says it all, providing one can decipher it.” (Sartre 
1998: 621). And “decipher” is indeed the right word, for Eye and Mind is a 
condensed, carefully crafted hieroglyphic. The hieroglyphic is organized in five 
sections in which Merleau-Ponty carefully interrogates our being flesh and our 
being of the flesh of the world. He contrasts science and painting, suggesting that 
“science manipulates things” and therefore “gives up living in them.” (1993, p.  
121). What art,  especially painting, interrogates, on the other hand, is the 
enigma of vision, that kind of “delirium” in which I can be where I am not; the 
enigma of depth, that of a being in layers, or of the flesh of the world. “[W]e 
cannot imagine how a mind could paint,” he says. “It is by lending his body to the 
world that the artist changes the world into paintings. To understand these 
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transubstantiations we must go back to the working, actual body... the body 
which is an intertwining of vision and movement” (Ibid, p. 123-4). The enigma of 
vision is thus the enigma of the body and of its movement. What vision teaches 
us immediately is what characterizes the body most: I want to be there and, 
without knowing how, there I am. That is the delirium of vision and of painting, 
of the moving body in its gaze—to be at-a-distance (Ibid, p. 127). Which is the 
enigma of all flesh: its radiation beyond itself. (Ibid, p. 145). And the working of 
this dialogical “system” of intertwinings between vision, the body, the voice, and 
the world is what configures a flesh of bodies, of collective “bodies” and of the 
world, a flesh that is not One but plural, incommensurably pluri-perspectival and 
pluri-dimensional, because it is made of layers and of crisscrossings of visions 
and visibles that could never be grasped as a totalized whole. 
Such is the hieroglyphic appearance of the notion of flesh in Eye and 
Mind., which is different to the way in which the concept was introduced in the 
Preface to Signs. In the latter, the texture of the flesh of the world, its 
intercorporeity and plurality, gets more explicitly theorized. “Take [the] others,” 
Merleau-Ponty says, “at the moment they appear in the world’s flesh.” They “are 
not fictions with which I might people my desert—offspring of my spirit and 
forever unactualized possibilities—but my twins or the flesh of my flesh. 
Certainly I do not live their life; they are definitively absent from me and I from 
them. But that distance becomes a strange proximity as soon as one comes back 
home to the perceptible world, since the perceptible is precisely that which can 
haunt more than one body without budging from its place” (1964a, p.  15). To 
which he later adds: “Everything rests upon the insurpassable richness, the 
miraculous multiplication of perceptible being, which gives the same things the 
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power to be things for more than one perceiver, and makes some of the things—
human and animal bodies—have not only hidden faces but an ‘other side,’ a 
perceiving side.” (Ibid, p. 16) This having both a perceivable—I indeed perceive 
them—and a perceiving side—they indeed seem capable of perceiving what I 
perceive and even to perceive myself perceiving the same things they perceive—
is what makes them flesh, the element that “has no name in any philosophy” and 
that “brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being”. This system 
of mirrors, of perceived-perceivers, or of sensible-sentients—as he calls them in 
The Visible and the Invisible—is a system of two-dimensional (Ibid, p. 136), 
reversible beings, beings with style, therefore of bringing new meanings and 
events into the world, into a world that is also flesh—since flesh is the element of 
both bodies as well as that of inter-bodies, of the intercoporeal. 
As we said above, however, it is in the unfinished introduction to what 
was going to be called “The Origin of Truth” that Merleau-Ponty offers his richer 
treatment of the concept of flesh. In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty, 
repeating a gesture characteristic of his style of thought, starts once again from 
the beginning, from the evidence of there being something, from what he calls 
the “perceptual faith”, our un-doubtful experience of a world about us. 
Perceptual faith precedes doubts, it is primordial: I do not doubt the existence of 
the world due to the fact that it is indeed myself who perceives it. This faith does 
not lack justification, since there is a constitutive irreducibility of the plurality of 
perceptions—of other perceived-perceivers—that populate and cohabit with me 
that “miraculous multiplication of perceptible being” that Merleau-Ponty talks 
about in Signs. Here, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: “the thing perceived 
by the other is doubled: there is the one he perceives, God knows where, and 
 18 
there is the one I see, outside of his body, and which I call the true thing—as he 
calls true thing the table he sees and consigns to the category of appearances the 
one I see.” (1968: p. 9-10) What is then the thing that both my perception and 
that of the other open to? An imperialistic subjectivism would call “true” my 
perception and “false” the other’s”: The “imperialism” of “my thing.” But this 
imperialism does not last long, since in actuality “I believe in the other” (Ibid, p. 
10) since I have faith in it in the same way I have faith in the existence of the 
world we both perceive. 
“Faith” is thus for Merleau-Ponty the concept that grasps our “initial 
openness upon the world.” Faith, “not knowledge, since the world is here not 
separated from our hold on it, since, rather than affirmed, it is taken for granted, 
rather than disclosed, it is non-dissimulated, non-refuted” (Ibid, p. 28). The 
philosopher must reject both mere “knowledge” and mere “description,” he or 
she “must, in a word, reflect.” Reflection “saves us” from empiricism, says 
Merleau-Ponty, but it does so by naively turning the incarnate subject into a 
transcendental subject and reality into ideality (Ibid, p. 29). The philosophy of 
reflection has a point in what it denies—an “exterior relationship between a 
world in itself and myself” (Ibid, p. 32).  
 
Very different from the blindness of the Lacanian death drive, in this case 
Merleau Ponty stresses the the plurality of perspectives, the plurality of 
reflections. It is thus that Merleau-Ponty states the plurality of flesh, since the 
flesh of the world is a being which has “several entries” (Ibid, p. 90): “we are 
catching sight of the necessity of another operation besides the conversion to 
reflection, more fundamental than it, of a sort of hyper-reflection (sur-réflexion) 
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that would also take itself and the changes it introduces into the spectacle into 
account” (Ibid, p. 38). Hyper-reflection must “plunge into the world instead of 
surveying it” (Ibid, p. 38-9), it must plunge in the plurality of the intercorporeal 
intertwining of perceived-perceivers that the world understood as flesh is.  
In our view, theorizing the multiplicity and generativity that characterizes 
the real of  intercorporeal flesh of the world is crucial in the critique of the 
populist-antagonistic logic described earlier. The flesh, indeed, is not One. 
Moreover, the flesh is neither one nor two, but infinite. In The Visible and the 
Invisible, this alternative vision is presented in critical dialogue with Sartre, to 
whom Merleau-Ponty says: what if “instead of the other and me being two 
parallel For Itselfs each on his own stricken with the same mortal evil... we be 
some for the others a system of For Itselfs, sensitive to one another, such that the 
one knows the other not only in what he suffers from him, but more generally as 
a witness, who can be challenged because he is also himself accused, because he 
is not a pure gaze upon pure being any more than I am, because his views and my 
own are in advance inserted into a system of partial perspectives, referred to one 
same world in which we coexist and where our views intersect. For the other to 
be truly the other, it does not suffice and it is not necessary that he be a scourge, 
the continued threat of an absolute reversal of pro and con... It is necessary and it 
suffices that he have the power to decenter me, to oppose his centering to my 
own...” (Ibid, p. 82). 
Furthermore, the social space, a plural, reversible space of individual and 
collective beings equally reversible—both perceiving and perceived—does not 
need an “ontology” such as the one postulated by Mouffe following Lacan. This 
plural/infinite space of the flesh of the world is not necessarily harmonic and 
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consensual. In fact, it could hardly be so, since the relationality proper of this 
encounter of dis-centering perspectives is radically destabilizing. But this flesh, 
that is not One, does not need to be a dichotomist space of mutually exclusive 
‘identities’ either. The ‘internal frontiers’ are also many and, being many, they 
are not only frontiers but also bridges, and not only frontiers and bridges but 
also invisible networks and force lines that make up the unstable equilibrium the 
social flesh is. 
 
4. Closing Remarks: From Populist Nominalization towards an 
Aesthetic Matrix of Fleshy Multiplicity 
 
In describing the radicality of Merleau-Ponty’s final project, Bruce Young 
states: “My use of the phrase ‘ontological matrix’ is not mere jargon. Merleau-
Ponty does not offer a new theory, a new ontology, within the traditional matrix, 
that is, within the network of basic presuppositions we have inherited from our 
cultural traditions about what otherness, sameness, subjecthood and so on are. 
Rather, as he stresses from the very first page of his last and tragically 
uncompleted work, he is out to question these root presuppositions themselves. 
[And this] transition to a radically new ontological matrix is... a practical matter, 
a whole new way of relating in practice to otherness...” (Young: 86-7). In 
agreement with Young, but avoiding any claim to ontology, we would like to 
suggest the need to rethink the social and the political from an embodied and 
embedded –aesthetic- logic, one that produces sensual knowledges and that does 
not aim at conceptual/political  totalization.  
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As we saw above, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a plural flesh offers an 
alternative path to the one advanced by the late Laclau and Mouffe and is the one 
that Judith Butler (2015a), for example, has found appealing in her recent 
attempts to theorize a model for a radical, social and plural democracy (2015b). 
In her recent works, Butler has devoted a significant part of her writing to 
challenging those either/or models of mutually exclusive identities that could 
too easily lead to a politics of violence. This “hyper-reflective” position of a plural 
and conflicting social world offers an alternative theory of radical democracy 
where the no closure attempts to resolve  enigma of the built-in decentering of 
the plurality of perspectives Merleau-Ponty’s attributes to the intercorporeal 
world of flesh. In her words: “Merleau-Ponty’s enormously provocative final 
work, The Visible and the Invisible, contains within it some of the most beautiful 
writing we have from him, a writing that not only is about vision and touch, but 
that seeks, in its own rhythms and openness, to cast language in the mold of the 
relations he attempts to describe. I would wager that this chapter [The 
Intertwining-the Chiasm] is the most important work for most feminists [...] 
because it attempts in a certain way to offer an alternative to the erotics of 
simple mastery. It makes thinking passionate, because it overcomes, in its 
language and in its argument, the distinction between a subject who sees and 
one who is seen, a subject who touches and one who is touched. It does not, 
however, overcome the distinction by collapsing it” (2015: 51). The distinction 
between subjects—or between subject positions, we could also say, using the 
post-structuralist language of Laclau and Mouffe’s earlier work—of course 
remains, but it remains in the form of a relationality that goes beyond the 
mutually negating logic of the friend-enemy distinction. Following, or rather in 
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dialogue with, Merleau-Ponty, for Butler, the social field is a field of alterity, of a 
precedence of the “other” over the “I”, but of an indeterminate precedence that 
does not cause the “I” but rather inaugurates it. And this inauguration is 
performed in such a way that establishes an ethos of mutually instituting and 
decentering subjectivities in a world of irreducible plurality. Other authors have 
also contributed to this search for a different “way of doing politics” implicit in 
Merleau-Ponty’s theorizing of the flesh of the bodies and of the flesh of the world 
(Plot, 2014), most notably Claude Lefort’s philosophy of the political as the 
question of forms of society and the idea of democracy as a society without a 
body (1991). By describing democracy as a society without a body, what Lefort 
was doing was to offer a phenomenology of a form of society in which no-body, 
no entity, and no subject, individual or collective, is capable of “embodying” 
power—thus power, in a democratic society, is and remains an “empty place”. In 
his view, in the democratic form of society, no actor can claim to be entitled to 
rule, simply because the social flesh is not a determined body, with its organs 
and its naturally defined hierarchies. Democracy is a society without a body 
because it institutes the type of social field that is now also being theorized by 
Butler: one of an unstable equilibrium (Plot, 2014, p.  33) of mutually 
decentering and instituting subjectivities with no end in sight.  
We hope that the connections between different theorizations of the real, 
and the alternative political imaginaries they inspire, are becoming more evident 
at this point. In our view, it is pertinent to say that both accounts give certain 
accounts of ‘excess’.  In the first framework (Lacanian,) excess has to be excluded 
and the act of exclusion, concealed. This is theorized as the condition sine-qua-
non for the emergence of meaning and subjectivity, as well as social order. In 
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political terms, this foundational ‘lack’ has inspired the thinking of totalizing 
hegemonic articulatory practices (such as elaborated in the work of Laclau and 
Mouffe) in their construction of a provisional ‘wholeness’ that precisely attempt 
to cover that inaugural lack. As explained above, this is achieved through the 
establishment of an antagonistic frontier between a ‘we’ and a ‘they’. As the 
studies of fantasy—or the libidinal counterpart of hegemony—allow us to see 
(Yegenoglou, 2008; Glynos and Stravakakis, 2008; Palacios, 2009; 2013; 
Weisband, 2018),  antagonism is not only about ‘meaning’ but is also about 
desire; that is, excluded others are not only perceived as a threat to the stability 
of identity, but also as a threat to the possibility of enjoyment. Hortense Spillers, 
in thinking about the status of black bodies in the context of the transatlantic 
slave trade, has provided a useful way of thinking about this problem with her 
notion of ‘pornotrope’: “(1) the captive body becomes the source of an 
irresistible, destructive sensuality, (2) at the same time –in stunning 
contradiction – the captive body is reduced to a thing, becoming a being for the 
captor; (3) in this absence from a subject position, the captured sexualities 
provide a physical and biological expression of otherness; (4) as a category of 
‘otherness’, the captive body translates into a potential for pornotroping and 
embodies sheer physical powerlessness that slides into a more general 
‘powerlessness’” (Spillers, 2003, p. 206). 
This antagonistic grammar does not characterize the post-phenomenological 
view of excess. In this case, excess offers instead a solid platform for the thinking 
about forms of vulnerability, precariety, and co-dependence. As the flesh escapes 
the traditional dualistic epistemological distinctions – where elements are 
perceived in their ‘separatedness’ –vwe are forced to think of assemblages, 
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networks, of visible and invisible elements, human and not human, interacting 
and affecting each other. Furthermore, the flesh of the world in its multiplicity 
and infinity does not need (as in the previous account) and cannot be reduced to 
any form of totalizing/singularization. In this sense, it could be argued that the 
flesh offers a radical ethical notion of relationality from which the unevenness of 
power can be deconstructed, and as such, we would like to situate this ethical-
aesthetic matrix within contemporary critical theory.  If some authors such as 
Butler or Lefort commit to a decentered notion of democracy, it is also worth 
mentioning here the striking commonalities between the notion of the flesh and 
some promising accounts in feminist science and technology studies, new 
materialities and queer affect, as well as in the field of critical race studies. All of 
them, even with different emphasis and agendas, stress the irreducibility of 
heterogeneity and the relational and generative force of the thingly-being-with 
(Barad, 2007; Muñoz, 1997; Braidotti, 2013; Haraway, 2016; Lowenhaupt Tsing, 
2015; Moten, 2018; Musser, 2018). 
It is from this relational ethos that we would like to (re)think the political. 
Remaining within the language of Merleau-Ponty, our goal is to be able to think, 
for example, about how the above discussed concepts of ‘faith’ and 
‘visibility/invisibility’ need to be deconstructed and critiqued precisely vis a vis 
the ethics of the plural assemblages of the flesh (Wilderson, 2010; Moten, 2018; 
Musser; 2018).  At the same time, it is these notions that might allow us to 
rethink the psychoanalytic singular notion of the unconscious, and further 
encourage the (re)thinking of a ‘decentered’ unconscious linked precisely to 
those spaces of opacity, erasure and invisibility characteristic of the social 
understood as flesh. It is beyond the scope of this paper to further elaborate on 
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this. Nevertheless, it is our contention that different forms of desire are to be 
imagined and remembered, once we situate ourselves in this aesthetic matrix of 
a plural flesh. In this sense, we would like to claim the centrality of the erotics in 
the workings of the flesh. An erotics not bound to anxiety and antagonism (and 
its ‘porno-trope’ as elaborated by Spillers), but to the ethics of eros and 
mutuality. 
Although certainly none of these notions of the real find closure in a 
particular or definite political project, it is fair to acknowledge that they do 
inform alternative political horizons while giving an account of a ‘not-being-
there’ and a ‘fleshy-being-with’ counterpart. In our view, to think of these 
epistemologies and the political horizons they inspire has urgent practical 
implications. We do need to find a different—which, as suggested, we would like 
to call “aesthetic” (Plot 2014; Palacios, 2013)—matrix for a plural, radical, and 
critical politics from the one accepted as unavoidable by Mouffe—a fellow 
traveler in the project of a radical and social democracy.  If deprived of its 
fascination with the populist “way of doing politics” and its Schmittean ontology 
of the political, it looks to us to be a welcome reaction to a contemporary 
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